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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how preference heterogeneity affects the ability of the poor to extract resources
from the rich. We study the equilibrium of a game in which coalitions of individuals form parties,
parties propose platforms, and all individuals vote, with the winning policy chosen by plurality.
Political parties are restricted to offering platforms that are credible (in that they belong to the Pareto
set of their members). The platforms specify the values of two policy tools: a general redistributive
tax which is lumpsum rebated and a series of taxes whose revenue is used to fund specific (targeted)
goods. We show that taste conflict first dilutes but later reinforces class interests. When the degree
of taste diversity is low, the equilibrium policy is characterized by some amount of general income
redistribution  and  some  targeted  transfers.  As  taste  diversity  increases  in  society,  the  set  of
equilibrium policies becomes more and more tilted towards special interest groups and against
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Societies are heterogeneous both in preferences and in incomes. The consequences of
this are manifested in outcomes as diverse as residential and schooling choices to political
aﬃliations, armed conﬂicts, and breakdowns of society or civil war. From Marxist
theories of class struggle to Tiebout models of individual sorting, thinking about how
diﬀerences among individuals are resolved has played a critical role in our attempts to
understand society.
This paper seeks to understand how diversity in preferences aﬀects the basic con-
ﬂict between rich and poor, particularly regarding their opposing views on redistribution.
More generally, this paper asks how do class and preference conﬂicts interact? If indi-
viduals, particularly those with low income, do not agree on how resources (tax revenue)
should be allocated across projects, how does this aﬀect the ability of the poor to press
for redistribution? On the one hand, one may intuitively think that conﬂicting prefer-
ences over resource allocation may create cleavages among poorer individuals and thus
work against their general class interest. On the other hand, the opposite intuition is
also possible: the presence of many narrow “special-interest groups” may create an in-
centive for wealthier individuals to ally themselves with the general interest of the poor
if this implies a lower overall tax burden. Or, does conﬂict over the preferred way to
allocate resources simply lead to even greater overall redistribution since there are more
varied interests to satisfy?
This paper aims to (partially) answer the questions raised above by analyzing how
income and preference diversity interact in an environment in which political parties
and party platforms are endogenous. The government is assumed to be able to both
redistribute income and to fund special-interest projects (e.g., local or group-speciﬁc
public goods), all from proportional income taxation. Individuals diﬀer in income (they
can be either “poor” or “rich”) and also as to which special interest project (if any) they
beneﬁt from. Heterogeneity in the ability to enjoy a particular special-interest project
can be thought of as arising directly from diﬀerences in preferences (perhaps as a result
of diﬀerent ethnic or religious aﬃliations) or from diﬀerences in geographic locations (if,
for example, tax revenue is used to fund local public goods). It can also be thought of as
arising from the diﬀerential ability of agents to organize themselves in (special interest)
1groups that then participate in the political arena.
We study the equilibrium of a game in which representatives of diﬀerent groups
form parties, parties propose platforms, and all individuals vote, with the winning policy
chosen by plurality. Political parties are restricted to oﬀering platforms that are credible
(in that they belong to the Pareto set of their members and hence will not be renegotiated
ex post). The platforms specify the values of two policy tools: a general redistributive
tax which is lump-sum rebated (or used to fund the general public good) and a series of
taxes whose revenue is used to fund the speciﬁc (targeted) goods tailored to particular
preferences or localities.
We show that there is an equilibrium in which a party representing the poor wins
with a policy of maximum general redistributive taxation. In addition, there also can
exist an equilibrium with a heterogeneous political coalition consisting of an alliance
between the rich and some of the interest groups. This coalition engages in a policy
of redistribution targeted towards the special interest groups within the coalition and
in a lower level of overall redistribution. As this coalition has an incentive to form
to overturn the policy of maximum general redistribution, we focus on its equilibrium
platform and examine how its policies are aﬀected by the degree of diversity—i.e., by
changes in the probability that any two individuals belong to the same interest group.
Our analysis demonstrates that the intuitions expressed previously capture impor-
tant elements of the analysis of the eﬀect of preference diversity on class politics: in-
creased diversity ﬁrst dilutes but later reinforces class interests. When the degree of
preference diversity is low, the equilibrium coalition policy is characterized by some de-
gree of general income distribution and some targeted transfers. As a group, however,
the poor obtain less income redistribution than if preference heterogeneity did not exist
and the rich pay a lower level of total taxes. As diversity increases in society, the set
of equilibrium policies this coalition can oﬀer becomes more and more tilted towards
the special interest groups and against general redistribution; the poor are made worse
oﬀ. As diversity increases further, however, this situation is not sustainable. We show
that there exists a critical threshold of diversity above which the ruling coalition breaks
down and the only policy that can emerge supports exclusively general redistribution.
In fact, this policy is identical to the one that would be instituted in the absence of any
taste diversity at all. Thus, while at ﬁrst increased diversity destroys solidarity among
2diﬀerent groups of poor individuals, at a suﬃciently high level of diversity, conﬂict in
preferences is ignored and the traditional class conﬂict regains its primacy.
When the measure of individuals that belong to interest groups is not too large, the
heterogeneous coalition that emerges is unique. When it is large, the same heterogeneous
coalition exists, with the same comparative statics behavior. In addition, however,
there may exist another heterogeneous coalition composed solely of interest groups—the
“interest groups” coalition. The policies of this coalition have higher overall taxation
than the policies of the coalition between the rich and the interest groups, capturing the
intuition that class conﬂict and preference conﬂict may simply lead to higher taxation.
The comparative statics on the policies of this coalition with respect to diversity, however,
are very similar to the ones just discussed. Higher levels of diversity are associated with
higher targeted taxes and everyone outside the coalition is made worse oﬀ.A t a h i g h
enough level of diversity, maximum general redistribution is the unique outcome.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the related theoretical
literature. In section 3 we present the model which includes a description of the economic
environment and the political process. Section 4 analyzes the political equilibrium
when the share of interest groups in the economy is not very large and in section 5 we
examine in depth the eﬀect of diversity on the unique coalition that emerges under these
circumstances. Section 6 extends the analysis to the case in which the share of interest
groups in society is large. We discuss the role of our main assumptions in section 7 and
conclude in section 8.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to a recent theoretical literature on redistribution and the provision
of public goods. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) analyze the eﬀect of increased
taste diversity on public good provision in a median voter model in which individuals
can fund only one of many possible public goods. Individuals diﬀer in their valuation
over these goods. As taste diversity increases, the beneﬁt for the average voter from
the public good chosen by the median voter decreases, leading to lower overall funding
for this good. In our model, on the other hand, the number of excludable public goods
is endogenous. Individuals face a tradeoﬀ between general redistribution and funding
3special interest goods. Increases in taste diversity at ﬁr s th a v ea ne ﬀect similar to
that in Alesina et al, i.e., general redistribution decreases. The decline in spending on
the non-excludable public good results from the need to satisfy an increasing number
of special interest groups and simultaneously maintain the rich in the coalition rather
than from an increased variance in preferences. As diversity increases further, however,
general redistribution is the only public good that is funded.
Lizzeri and Persico (2002) consider election campaigns which can promise voters
both targeted transfers and the provision of a universal public good. They analyze the
eﬀect of increasing the number of parties which compete for political power and show
that the greater the number of parties, the larger are the ineﬃciencies in the provision of
the public good.1 The reason for this is that, in equilibrium, parties divide the number
of voters equally among themselves and face an equal probability of winning the election.
Thus, when the number of parties increases, each party can win by catering to a smaller
share of the voters and ﬁnds it eﬀective to do so using targeted goods rather than by a
general universal good which beneﬁts other constituencies as well. This paper diﬀers
from ours in some important ways. First, the number of parties that exist is exogenous.
Second, voters are homogeneous in income. Thus, while it is possible to think of each
individual in their model as constituting its own special interest group (so preferences
are, de facto, diverse), an analysis of the eﬀect of changes in the extent of diversity is
not feasible in the model.
Roemer (1998) examines how the existence of a second issue other than general
redistribution aﬀects policy outcomes in a model with political parties. He shows that
the existence of another salient issue (e.g. religion) can work against the pure economic
interests of the poor if this non-economic issue is suﬃciently important (see also Besley
and Coate (2000)). Thus, whereas in Roemer’s model non-economic issues divide the
poor, in our model the political conﬂict is over the use of tax revenues.2 Furthermore,
while parties play an important role in both models, in our model the constituency and
number of parties is endogenous and individuals derive utility only from policies and not
1See also Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnson (1981) for a model of legislative bargaining over public good
provision which results in ineﬃcient provision.
2Levy (2005) also considers a model in which a conﬂict on the use of tax revenues, namely between
the provision of public education and income redistribution, divides the poor. Our model allows us to
ask how greater diversity in society aﬀects policies.
4from winning seats.
Finally, Austen-Smith and Wallerstein (2003) examine how general redistribution is
aﬀected by the existence of race in a model of legislative bargaining with an exogenous
number of legislators. Legislators can choose a level of aﬃrmative action to support
(where the latter guarantees a proportion of jobs with economic rents to a particular
racial group). Assuming that a legislator represents either high human-capital Whites,
low human-capital Whites or Blacks (in which case he maximizes a weighed average of
high and low human-capital Blacks), they ﬁnd that the existence of race hurts those who
have no positive economic interest in aﬃrmative action and who would instead beneﬁt
from redistribution, i.e., low human-capital Whites. In this sense, race works against
the common interest of poorer individuals. Our model diﬀers from Austen-Smith and
Wallerstein in that the political outcome in our model is a result of an electoral process
and not a legislative one. Consequently, the composition and hence the interests of
political parties are endogenously determined. Our model is also a simpler one in which
to ask how diversity aﬀects policies.
3 The Model
3.1 The Environment
The economy is populated by three general types of agents with total measure one. A
proportion λ has income ¯ y, and the remainder has income y < ¯ y.W e c a l l t h e ﬁrst group
the “rich” and the second the “poor”. We assume that the poor are a majority, i.e.,
λ<. 5, but, as will be made clear further on, this group is not homogeneous.
There are two types of goods in the economy. One is a consumption good, x,f r o m
which all agents derive utility. The other is a set of goods, indexed by i,w h i c hw ec a l l
“targeted goods” or speciﬁc public goods, in that they are assumed to be speciﬁco r
targeted for consumption for group i, i ∈ {1,2,...,M}. This property of certain goods
can be thought of as arising from either geographic or preference diﬀerences across groups.
For example, they can be locally provided goods (e.g., education, parks, hospitals) or
goods that will be used more by a particular group (e.g., goods that are associated with
a particular ethnic group). For simplicity, we assume that individuals who can derive
utility from these goods exist only among a subsection of the poor and we call this type
5of individuals “special interest groups”.3
Thus, special interest group i, derives utility both from x and from targeted good i
and its preferences are given by
U (x,qi)=x + V (qi), (1)
where qi is the quantity of good i and V is an increasing, concave, twice-diﬀerentiable
function satisfying V 0 (0) = ∞. For everyone else, preferences are given by:
U (x)=x. (2)
We assume that the share of all interest groups is less than half the population.
Section 6 examines the case in which the share of these groups exceeds 0.5.
Before describing the particular process that gives rise to political parties, we ﬁrst
turn to the policy space. We assume that there are two types of tax instruments available
to the population: a redistributive tax, τ, and a set of taxes, ti,u s e dt oﬁnance targeted
good i. Both are proportional income taxes. The proceeds from the redistributive tax
are lump-sum rebated back to the population.4 Thus, given a general tax τ and mean
income µ ≡ λy+(1− λ)y, the total amount of the lump-sum rebate is τµ. The speciﬁc
tax i, on the other hand, is used to produce a speciﬁc public good to which only group
i has access. We assume that it is produced at a constant marginal cost (normalized
to one) and entails as well a production (or distribution) ﬁxed cost of ci.T h u s , t h e
consumption of targeted good i is done exclusively by group i and is given by:
qi =
½tiµ−ci
ni if tiµ>c i
0 if tiµ ≤ ci
(3)
where ni is the number of individuals in speciﬁcg r o u pi.5 For simplicity we assume
ci = c for all i. As will be made clearer in sections 4 and 5, the existence of ﬁxed costs
plays no role in characterizing equilibria in the model, but they play a important role
in our analysis of the comparative statics of diversity. The assumption of no ﬁxed cost
associated with general redistribution, on the other hand, is inessential.
3See section 7 for a discussion of this assumption.
4Alternatively, the proceeds from the general tax can be thought of as being used to produce a general
public good to which everyone has equal access.
5T h es a m er e s u l t so b t a i ni fw ea s s u m et h a tt h es p e c i ﬁc good is a pure public good rather than a
publicly provided private good as assumed above.
6Taxation is assumed to be distortionary in the sense that it wastes resources of
G(τ+T) per capita, where T =
X
ti. The function G(.) i sa s s u m e dt ob ea ni n c r e a s i n g ,
convex function with G(0) = 0, G0 (0) = 0,a n dG0 (1) = ∞.6 This cost can represent the
resources expended in collection and the enforcement of taxation. In a more elaborate
model, it would be the cost associated with the loss of output incurred when endogenous
labour supply is distorted by taxation. We assume this cost is borne equally by all
agents.
It is useful at this point to write each type’s indirect utility function. For individuals
who do not belong to an interest group,
W (τ,T)=y(1 − τ − T)+τµ− G(τ + T) (4)
for y ∈ {y,y}, whereas for the interest groups:






whenever qi > 0 and otherwise it is as in (4).
3.2 The Political Process
The tax rates, general and speciﬁc, are determined via a political process. We analyze
a political process whose equilibrium prediction is a set of parties, the taxes they oﬀer,
and the winning tax policy.
We assume that each group in the population is represented in the political process
by one representative, a politician, whereas the rest of the group participates in the
election as voters.7 Thus, one interpretation of the interest groups in the model is
that these are the diﬀerent localities, or preference groups, that have actually been able
to organize themselves and be represented in the political process. The rest of the
poor, according to this interpretation, have not been able to organize themselves and
participate in the political process as an undiﬀerentiated mass who are only organized
on the basis of their general redistributive interest.
6The assumption of distortionary taxation is solely to ensure an interior solution to preferred tax
r a t e sa n dp l a y sn or o l eo t h e r w i s e .
7This assumption can approximate the idea that political representation or running for election is
costly.
7These representative politicians can either run on their own or they can form coali-
tions. In keeping with the basic citizen-candidate model (see Besley and Coate (1997)
and Osborne and Slivinski (1996)), we assume that parties that consist solely of a single
representative can only commit to the representative’s preferred policy. Extending this
same idea to coalitions, as in Levy (2004), we assume that a party that consists of agents
from diﬀerent groups can commit to any policy on the Pareto frontier of the members
of the party. We sometimes refer to policies oﬀered by a party as platforms.
Next we turn to describing how policies are chosen given a partition of the represen-
tative politicians into parties. We assume that political parties simultaneously choose
whether to oﬀer a platform or not (and what platform to oﬀer). Given the set of policies
oﬀered, individuals are assumed to vote sincerely. In particular, independently of party
membership of their representative, voters vote for the platform they prefer, as given
by their utility functions above. The winning policy is then chosen by plurality rule;
if there is more than one winning platform, then each is chosen with equal probability.
Note however that, generically, platforms will not tie and hence one platform will win
(although others may be oﬀered). If no platform is oﬀered, a default status quo policy
is implemented.8 We assume that all agents prefer their own ideal point to the default
policy. For simplicity, there are no costs of running for election or beneﬁts from holding
oﬃce.
Rather than write an extensive form game to determine which parties exist (i.e.,
to determine the partition of politicians into parties), we instead require that parties be
stable.9 In particular, an equilibrium is deﬁned as a set of policies and a partition of
representative politicians into parties such that a) the policies are best responses to one
another and b) parties are stable and platforms satisfy a tie breaking rule. This is made
precise below.
Consider a ﬁxed partition of the representatives of each group into parties (including
one-member parties). A candidate for equilibrium, χ,i sas e to fp o l i c i e so ﬀered by the
parties in the partition, which satisﬁes condition (i):
(i) For each party, there does not exist an alternative policy that is on its Pareto
frontier (including not oﬀering a platform) such that, taking the other platforms as given,
8The exact nature of the default policy plays no role in the analysis.
9See Levy (2004) for a related model.
8it improves the utility of all of its members, for at least one of them strictly.
We then further require that the composition of each party be stable (a condition
on the partition and platforms oﬀered in it) and we require platforms to satisfy a "tie
breaking" rule. We say that a subcoalition "induces a new partition" by splitting from
its original coalition (with the remaining coalitions as in the original partition). We
deﬁne formally an equilibrium as consisting of a candidate for equilibrium in a given
partition, χ, which also satisﬁes conditions (ii) and (iii):
(ii) There does not exist a subcoalition within a party that, if it splits, could induce
a new partition in which there exists a candidate for equilibrium χ0 which makes all of
the members of the subcoalition weakly better oﬀ.
(iii) For each party if, taking the other platforms as given, the set of winning plat-
f o r m si se x a c t l yt h es a m ew h e ni to ﬀers its platform as when it doesn’t, it chooses not
to oﬀer this platform.
Condition (i) is a “party best response” condition which asserts that for a given
partition, and taking other platforms as given, each party member has a veto power
concerning deviations.10 Similarly, single-member parties who oﬀer a platform or not
should ﬁnd their action optimal, taking other platforms as given.11
Parties, however, are endogenous in our model in the sense that such partitions can
be stable only if there is no subcoalition within a party that can proﬁtably split from its
party, as speciﬁed in condition (ii). Note that condition (ii) allows the remaining parties
(including the remainder of the original party) to modify their platforms in response to a
party split. That is, the deviators take into consideration that following a break-up, the
platforms in the new partition must satisfy condition (i). Condition (ii) is “optimistic” in
the sense that a subcoalition prefers to deviate if there exists an equilibrium candidate in
the new partition which at least weakly improves its utility even though there may exist
another equilibrium candidate in the new partition which would decrease its members’
utility. This allows us to reduce the number of equilibria and simpliﬁes the analysis as
seen below in Proposition 1.12
10This assumption gives all members veto power, which may not be realistic but allows us to avoid
analyzing a bargaining game among the party members.
11It is easy to show using Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 which are introduced further on, that a pure
strategy candidate for equilibrium exists for all partitions.
12We allow only for party break-ups and not for the formation of new parties (as in Ray and Vohra’s
9Finally, condition (iii) is a tie-breaking rule which restricts attention to equilibria
in which whenever all party members are indiﬀerent between oﬀering a platform and
not doing so, they prefer the latter. This can be thought of as the less “costly” action
(we do not explicitly assume that there are costs of oﬀering a platform, but introducing
some small costs will not alter our results). This condition also simpliﬁes the analysis
by reducing the number of equilibria.
4 The Political Equilibrium
Our ﬁrst prediction is the equilibrium of the model. As we show below, there are two
possible (pure strategy) equilibria. In one of them, the common interest of the poor
is served. That is, the poor as a group manage to extract the optimal amount (from
their perspective) from the rich in the form of general redistribution. In the second
equilibrium, the poor as a group are divided. Some interest groups join forces with the
rich and by doing so reduce both general redistribution and overall tax burden. This
policy goes against the general interest of the poor. It is nonetheless beneﬁcial for
the interest groups that participate in the coalition with the rich since it allows these
to achieve a suﬃciently high level of targeted goods so as to make such an alliance
worthwhile.
4.1 Ideal Policies and Induced Preferences
In order to solve the equilibria of the model, it is useful to start by describing the ideal
points of each individual type. Let R denote the rich. These individuals’ preferred
outcome is (τ,t1,t 2,...,t M)=( 0 ,0,0,...0). The group of poor individuals who do not
belong to any interest group is denoted by P0. The preferred policy of this group is
(τ∗,0,0,...0) where τ∗ solves:
µ − y − G0(τ∗)=0 (6)
We will often refer to this outcome as “maximum redistribution”. Lastly, a poor in-





(1997) theory of coalitions). The main reason is that, in a multidimensional policy space, a stability
concept which allows for all types of deviations will typically result in no stable outcomes (see section 7
for a discussion of the stability concepts).
10by:
µ − y − G0(˜ τ + ˜ ti)=0 (7)
−y − G0(˜ τ + ˜ ti)+
µ
ni
V 0(qi(˜ ti)) = 0. (8)
At an interior solution in which both taxes are positive, (7) and (8) are satisﬁed
with equality. By (6), e τ + e ti = τ∗. At one corner solution, in which (7) is still satisﬁed
with equality but the left-hand-side of (8) is negative, then ˜ ti =0and ˜ τ = τ∗. At another
corner solution, (7) is not satisﬁed implying that ˜ τ =0and that ˜ ti >τ ∗.
Given the conditions specifying the ideal policies of the diﬀerent groups, we can put
more structure on the policies in the Pareto set of the diﬀerent coalitions as well as on
the induced preferences on these policies.
Lemma 1 Policies in the Pareto set of a coalition composed solely of poor agents
(who may belong to some interest groups) have total taxation of at least τ∗ and set the
targeted transfers of excluded interest groups to zero.
Proof: Denote such a coalition of Pisa n dp o s s i b l yP0 by C and its policy by
(ˆ τ,ˆ t1,ˆ t2...,ˆ tM). The coalition sets ˆ ti =0if i/ ∈ C since a positive tax rate for such an
interest group is not on its Pareto set. Note that, given a vector of tis, all members of




µ − y − G0(ˆ τ + ˆ T)=0 if ˆ τ>0 (9)
µ − y − G0(ˆ T) < 0 otherwise.
which, by (6), implies that total taxation (ˆ τ + ˆ T)i sa tl e a s tτ∗.||
Lemma 2 All voters not represented in the winning coalition prefer maximum
redistribution to the winning policy.
Proof: Note ﬁrst that R prefers maximum redistribution to any policy that can
be oﬀered by a winning coalition that it does not belong to, i.e. a coalition consisting
of some Pi groups or of P0 and some Pi groups. By Lemma 1, such a coalition oﬀers
policies with total taxation that is at least as large as τ∗ but some of the beneﬁts may be
targeted. Second, by Lemma 1, the winning policy gives zero targeted transfers to any
interest group that is not a member of the winning coalition. But whenever an interest
group is restricted to receiving zero targeted transfers, its preferred general tax rate is
11maximum redistribution, τ∗, by conditions (6) and (7). Finally, the Lemma trivially
holds for P0.||
From the proof of Lemma 2 above it follows that maximum redistribution is an
equilibrium of the model. To see this, consider a partition with no coalitions and suppose
that only P0 oﬀers a platform—its ideal policy of maximum redistribution. This policy
wins as it is preferred by all the poor (independently of whether they belong to an interest
group) to the ideal policy of R. Furthermore, it is preferred to the ideal policy of any Pi
by all other poor agents and by the rich. In both cases, the groups favoring maximum
redistribution over the alternative sum to over half the population and thus P0’s ideal
policy wins. As we next show, maximum redistribution is also an equilibrium candidate
in other partitions.
Lemma 3 Maximum redistribution oﬀered by P0 is an equilibrium candidate of
every partition in which either there is no coalition with a majority of the population or
in which, if a majoritarian coalition exists, then for at least one equilibrium candidate
the majoritarian coalition loses.
Proof: Consider either of the partitions described in the lemma above. Suppose
P0 oﬀers a policy of maximum redistribution. If only P0 oﬀers a platform, no non-
majoritarian party in the induced partition can, by oﬀering an alternative platform, win
against P0 since, by Lemma 2, all individuals excluded from such a party prefer P0 and
they constitute a majority. If a majoritarian party exists, furthermore, it too can lose
to P0 in an equilibrium candidate since it is not able to oﬀer a platform that Pareto
dominates P0 for a majority of its members and wins. Had such a platform existed,
then that same platform would also have Pareto dominated the winning policy in the
equilibrium candidate in which the majoritarian party loses, contradicting the initial
premise that the winning platform was an equilibrium policy for that partition.||
The next two lemmas will prove useful in the full characterization—in Proposition
1—of the equilibria of the model. We ﬁr s ts h o wi nL e m m a4t h a ta l la g e n t sh a v et h e
same preference ordering over platforms of parties to which they do not belong. Lemma
5 then shows that if an agent votes for a party diﬀerent from the one that represents
her, then the party that obtained these votes also receives the votes of the agents it
represents.
12Lemma 4 Given a partition, all agents have the same preference ordering over
feasible platforms oﬀered by parties to which they do not belong.
Proof: Fix a partition and any two (feasible) platforms, x and y,o ﬀered by parties
X and Y . Suppose ﬁrst that R or a coalition of R and some other groups is oﬀering one
of the two platforms. All the individuals not belonging to X or Y are poor and hence, by
Lemma 1, platforms x and y provide the interest groups among them with zero targeted
transfers. Thus, all excluded poor individuals share the same preferences ordering over
these platforms, independently of whether they belong to an interest group. Suppose
next that the platforms are oﬀered by two interest group coalitions either with or without
P0.L e t p l a t f o r m x be the platform with the higher level of T.B y (9), if platform x
has a higher level of T than platform y, then it must have a (weakly) lower level of τ.
This means that all poor agents who are not represented by either X or Y prefer y to
x, as do the rich since by (9) platform y has no higher a level of overall taxation (T +τ)
than x and has a better mix of taxes (a lower level of targeted taxation).||
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, all agents who do not vote for their own party’s
platform vote for the same party.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 4.||
Lemma 5 In equilibrium, if an agent votes for the platform of a party X to which
she does not belong, then all agents who belong to X vote for its platform as well.
Proof: First note that the Lemma holds whenever X is the unique party oﬀering
a platform. Suppose now that other platforms are oﬀered in equilibrium, and suppose
ﬁrst that a poor agent who does not belong to party X nonetheless prefers its platform
x to the alternatives. By Lemma 1, excluded agents receive zero targeted transfers
from party X. Consequently any poor agent who belongs to party X must prefer its
platform to the alternatives as well; these agents can be treated no worse by platform
x than excluded agents. If a rich agent belongs to X, then all alternative parties must
be composed of only poor agents. Thus if a poor excluded agent prefers x to other
platforms, it must be that other platforms propose no lower level of total taxation and a
worse mix of targeted and general taxation. Hence the rich must also prefer x to other
platforms.
Next suppose that the rich are excluded from party X,y e tp l a t f o r mx receives their
13votes. Since in this case party X must represent some interest group(s) or P0 or a
coalition of the two, the total sum of its taxes must equal at least τ∗. Given that the
rich prefer x to all other platforms that are oﬀered, then their own party is either not
oﬀering a platform or, if it is, the party must be a coalition with a platform consisting
of a worse mix of targeted and general taxes, and the remaining alternative parties must
be oﬀering higher levels of T (if they are oﬀering platforms). But this implies that a
poor agent who belongs to X will also prefer x to the alternative platforms oﬀered.||
Prior to presenting our ﬁrst major result, note that one uninteresting case to con-
sider is when at least half the population belongs to P0 as the only equilibrium is then
maximum redistribution. We henceforth assume that P0 consists of less than half the
population.
4.2 The Equilibrium: General versus Targeted Redistribution
We now characterize the equilibria of the model, focusing on pure strategy equilibria.
We show that in equilibrium either P0 wins the election or the winner is a unique type of
coalition composed of the rich and several interest groups. To characterize this coalition,
it is useful to introduce an additional concept. We say that a coalition represents m
groups if the number of diﬀerent representative politicians in the coalition is m.L e t
us deﬁne a coalition representing m groups as a “minimal winning coalition” if the
proportion of the population belonging to these m groups is no smaller than .5 and the
proportion belonging to any m − 1 groups is less than .5.
Proposition 1 In all pure strategy equilibria either P0 wins with a policy of maxi-
mum redistribution or a minimal winning coalition composed of R and a number of Pi
groups wins. This coalition oﬀers a policy with positive targeted transfers and lower
total taxation than τ∗. The policy satisﬁes conditions r and pi below.
Proof: We have already shown that P0 winning is an equilibrium. Consider an
equilibrium in which P0 neither wins on its own nor belongs to a winning coalition. It
follows that the equilibrium winning party, henceforth denoted by W, must be one of
the following: a coalition of R and some Pi groups, which we henceforth denote by PiR,
or R by itself, or a coalition of only some Pi groups (including only one by itself). Let
us denote the equilibrium winning platform by w. We will show that, in addition to the
14winning party, at most only the party in which P0 is participating, say S,c a nb eo ﬀering
a platform in this equilibrium.
Suppose that one of the active parties diﬀerent from W,s a yV , obtains votes from
only its own members. Consider the following deviation: V no longer oﬀers a platform.
By Lemma 4, all the votes it originally obtained must go to one and the same party. If
following the transfer of votes w still wins, then the equilibrium did not satisfy condition
(iii). Suppose instead that all votes V originally received go to another active party Z
(where Z may be S), if another exists, and Z wins. This, however, is a violation of
condition (i) as this is a proﬁtable deviation for the members of party V since if they vote
for Z they must prefer its platform to w. Note that no other outcome is possible as a
result of this deviation since all other active parties are still oﬀering the same platforms,
the parties that were silent are still silent, and thus the number of votes received by all
parties other than Z or W must remain constant.
Suppose next instead that V obtained votes from agents represented by other par-
ties. In particular, suppose that some agents who voted for V belong to another party
Q. Note that, by Lemma 5, this implies that the members of V must also vote for V ’s
platform, v.I f Q is not an active party then, by Corollary 1, if V no longer oﬀers a
platform, both the votes that it obtained from its own members and the votes it obtained
from (possibly only some of) the members of Q will be transferred to the same party.
Thus, the same logic as above implies that the members of V w i l ln o tb em a d ew o r s e
oﬀ. Hence V cannot oﬀer a platform in equilibrium.
Finally, if Q is an active party, this also cannot be an equilibrium. To see this
note that since some members of Q voted for V then, by Lemma 4, all other agents
who do not belong to Q must also prefer v to Q’s platform (including, by Lemma 5,
the members of V ) and furthermore, all members of Q must prefer v over w.T h u s , i f
Q no longer were to oﬀer a platform, the votes originally obtained by Q (possibly some
agents that belong to Q voted for it) would also be transferred to V .T h u s , a s a r e s u l t
of this deviation either V w o u l dw i na n dm a k ea l lm e m b e r so fQ better oﬀ or it would
make no diﬀerence and w would still win. Either case rules out Q oﬀering a platform
in equilibrium.
We now show that S cannot be oﬀering a platform either. Suppose ﬁrst that S is
a coalition. Furthermore, suppose that a mass m constituting at least 50% of the entire
15population did not prefer the winning platform w to maximum redistribution. Then S
could oﬀer a platform of maximum redistribution (as this policy is on the party’s Pareto
frontier and, by Lemma 2, all members of this party prefer an outcome of maximum
redistribution to w) and win against w.T h u s , m agents constituting at least 50% of
the entire population must prefer w to maximum redistribution. Note, furthermore,
that these m agents must belong to W as this preference ordering is not possible for
any individual outside the party. By transitivity and Lemma 2, this same mass will also
prefer w to any other feasible platform oﬀered by any other party. Hence, if P0 were
to split from S, w would still be an equilibrium candidate of the induced partition. By
condition (ii), P0 will split and thus in equilibrium P0 cannot belong to a coalition.
Alternatively, suppose S is not a coalition and consists only of P0.F o r P0 not to
win, it implies, as above, that a mass m constituting at least 50% of the entire population
and belonging to W must prefer w to maximum redistribution. Thus, whether P0 oﬀers
a policy or not cannot change the outcome and by condition (iii), P0 will not oﬀer a
platform in equilibrium. The same logic implies that if there are any coalitions in this
partition, they must split.
From the above we can conclude that when P0 is not in the winning coalitions then
for all partitions in which W is winning, in equilibrium only its platform is oﬀered, at
least 50% of the population belongs to this coalition and prefers its policies to maximum
redistribution, and there are no other coalitions.13 From this it immediately follows that
the only candidate for W is a PiR coalition as all other candidates are, by assumption,
unable to meet the 50% requirement. Next we show that the PiR coalition must be a
minimal winning one.
Suppose now that the winning PiR coalition is a larger than a minimal winning
one. It can only oﬀer policies (ˆ τ,ˆ t1,...,ˆ tM) that both belong to its Pareto set and that a
majority of its members prefer to maximum redistribution (otherwise P0 oﬀers maximum
redistribution and wins). The last requirement implies that the policy must satisfy the
conditions below:
¯ y(1 − ˆ τ −
X
ˆ ti)+ˆ τµ− G(ˆ τ +
X
ˆ ti) ≥ ¯ y(1 − τ∗)+τ∗µ − G(τ∗) (r)
13It should be noted that the same proof as above can be used to show that the default policy (i.e.,
the one put in place if no party oﬀers a platform) cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
16y(1 − ˆ τ −
X
ˆ ti)+ˆ τµ− G(ˆ τ +
X
ˆ ti)+V (
ˆ tiµ − c
ni
) ≥ y(1 − τ∗)+τ∗µ − G(τ∗) (pi)
The ﬁrst condition, r, describes the set of policies that an R agent prefers to the
policy of maximum redistribution. The second set of conditions, pi, describes the set of
policies that an agent belonging to Pi prefers to the policy of maximum redistribution.
If there are k diﬀerent interest groups in the coalition, then this condition must hold
for at least k0 of them so that the members of the k0 groups plus the rich constitute a
minimum winning coalition.
A subcoalition consisting of R and all the Pi groups for which pi holds can defect
(if this condition holds for all Pi groups, then all of them other than the smallest one
can defect) and oﬀer a policy in the new Pareto set that (weakly) dominates the original
one for all members of the sub-coalition and sets the targeted transfer for the excluded
interest group(s) to zero. This subcoalition would represent a majority of the voters and
this new policy would still satisfy r and pi for any i for which it was satisﬁed previously
and thus win. Thus, in order to be an equilibrium the coalition must be a minimal
winning one and respect r and pi for all the Pi in the coalition.
To continue showing that this is an equilibrium, note that no members of the coali-
tion would defect since, if some did, the coalition would represent fewer agents (and,
in particular, less than half the population), and hence, from the logic above, P0 would
win—an outcome which makes the original coalition members worse oﬀ by conditions r
and pi. Lastly, an implication of pi is that the policy oﬀered must have positive ti’s
for all P0
is in the coalition and thus, to satisfy r, must also have a lower level of overall
taxation than τ∗.
We next turn to showing that the last remaining possibilities for a winning coalition—
coalitions which contain P0—cannot win in equilibrium. Consider a winning platform
oﬀered by a coalition composed of P0 and R. Consider the following deviation: P0
breaks from the coalition. By Lemma 3, as there is no majoritarian platform in this
induced partition, maximum redistribution is an equilibrium candidate. Thus, this is a
proﬁtable deviation for P0 and hence the original policy was not an equilibrium. Next
consider a coalition of P0 and some P0
is. If this coalition is a majoritarian coalition,
then if P0 splits it induces a partition in which there are no majoritarian coalitions and
by Lemma 3, maximum redistribution is an equilibrium candidate. Hence P0 will split.
17If the coalition is not majoritarian then, either there is no majoritarian coalition and the
same logic as before implies that P0 splits, or there is a majoritarian coalition that is
losing. Hence, by Lemma 3, maximum redistribution is an equilibrium candidate if P0
splits. Consequently the original policy was not an equilibrium.
Lastly consider a winning platform, w,o ﬀered by a coalition composed of P0,s o m e
P0
isa n dR. As established above, it must be that a mass m constituting at least 50% of
the entire population and belonging to the union of R and some of the Pis in the winning
coalition must prefer wto maximum redistribution. Otherwise P0 would split since there
exists an equilibrium in the induced partition in which maximum redistribution wins.
But, in that case, a subcoalition of R and some P0
is that constitute this mass m can split
from the coalition and win with a policy w0 that makes all the subcoalition members at
least as well oﬀ as under w. This policy exists as, while respecting the same constraints
(it must be preferred to maximum redistribution), it need only lie in the Pareto frontier
of the subcoalition rather than in that of the larger coalition. Hence, the original set of
policies could not have constituted an equilibrium. This completes our proof.||
We conclude that in any pure strategy equilibrium the outcome is either maximum
redistribution (when P0 wins) or (when the PiR coalition wins) a policy consisting of a
bundle of speciﬁc tax rates and a general redistribution tax, where the latter is set at
a lower level than under maximum redistribution. However, note that whenever such
a PiR coalition can form (i.e., whenever a policy exists on the Pareto frontier of its
members and satisﬁes r and pi), there will be an incentive for it do so as its members are
made better oﬀ than in the alternative equilibrium of maximum redistribution. Thus, in
a more elaborate model of party formation, a PiR coalition would solve its coordination
problem in such cases and the equilibrium in which P0 wins would not exist. The next
section of the paper is therefore devoted to analyzing the conditions for such a coalition
to be feasible and characterizing its policies. We focus particularly on the eﬀect of
diversity in society on the equilibrium policies and the ability of the PiR coalition to
form and win.
185 Diversity and Redistribution
Our model yields an interesting prediction regarding the eﬀe c to fd i v e r s i t yo ne q u i l i b r i u m
policies. We will show that greater diversity is associated with policies of the PiR
coalition that yield less general redistribution and more targeted redistribution towards
interest groups. In this sense, greater diversity harms the general interests of the poor.
We will also show, however, that there exists a critical level of diversity beyond which
the PiR coalition breaks down and the unique (pure strategy) equilibrium is maximum
redistribution. Thus our model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between diversity
and general redistribution.
For simplicity, we restrict our analysis to the case in which interest groups have the
same size, ni = n and focus exclusively on policies that treat interest groups in the PiR
coalition symmetrically, i.e., ti = t. We denote the number of special interest groups in
the coalition by N and therefore the total speciﬁc taxes are deﬁned as T = Nt. As all
Pi b e l o n g i n gt ot h ePiR coalition have the same induced preferences over these policy
bundles, we will use P to denote the generic interest group within the coalition and
denote the coalition as the PRcoalition. Henceforth, we treat the interest groups in the
coalition as a unitary player that chooses among (T,τ) schemes satisfying the constraint
that T = Nt.14
In what follows, we will think of an increase in diversity as an increase in the
number of interest groups (and hence diﬀerent tastes) represented by a given share
of the population. That is, keeping constant the share of the interest groups in the
population, an increase in diversity is an increase in M -the number of distinct interest
groups in the population- and consequently a decrease in n — the number of individuals
that belong to any interest group. Note that this implies a decrease in the probability
that any two individuals belong to the same interest group.
We further simplify our comparative statics analysis by treating N as a continuous
variable. This avoids the problem that arises from an increase in diversity changing,
in a discontinuous fashion, the size of the winning coalition. To see why this would
occur, note that in a discrete model the coalition would generically include more than
50% of the population. Hence, as the number of interest groups increased it would be
14The assumption of symmetric treatment does not aﬀect the qualitative results.
19possible to decrease, in a discontinuous fashion, the measure of individuals represented
by the winning coalition until the latter represented exactly half the population. To
avoid this uninteresting wrinkle in the analysis, we henceforth keep the proportion of the
population in the coalition ﬁxed at 50% by treating N as a continuous variable. Thus,
letting k denote the total number of agents belonging to any interest group within the
coalition, we have k = Nn. An increase in diversity consequently does not change k,
but rather changes n so as to keep k constant, i.e., dN = k/dn.15
We can now rewrite q as total revenue Tµminus the total redistribution costs cN,






which is equivalent to the expression in (3).
5.1 A Useful Diagram
It is easiest to think about equilibrium policies using the following ﬁgures. In Figure 1
we describe typical indiﬀerence curves for individuals in the coalition of R and P.T h e
τ∗ line gives the locus of (T,τ) that satisfy (9); the T∗ curve gives the locus of (T,τ)
that satisfy the ﬁrst order condition w.r.t. T (a condition analogous to 8):







For expositional ease, our discussion assumes that P0s i d e a lp o l i c yi sa ni n t e r i o r
solution, i.e., has τ>0,T >0.16 Thus, P’s ideal policy lies at the intersection of T∗
15Formally, we can construct a continuous model by letting φ be the measure of individuals that belong
to interest groups and ˆ N be the measure of interest groups, implying that
φ
ˆ N = n.W e c a n t h e n l e t
k ≡ 0.5 − λ denote the measure of members of interest groups in the coalition and hence a measure N
of interest groups in the coalition is deﬁned by
φ
ˆ N N = k. In a continuous model, the PRcoalition would
still win in equilibrium but not with probability 1 since P0 would also challenge the election and win .5 of
the votes. The nature of the analysis below will not change much otherwise and to keep matters simple,
we analyze the equilibrium that exists in the discrete version of the model. That is, we are not interested
in the equilibria of a continuous model but rather use this assumption to simplify the presentation of our
results.
16The analysis and the results are similar when P’s ideal policy is at a corner solution with τ =0and
T>τ
∗. If the ideal policy, however, is at the corner solution of maximum redistribution, the coalition
cannot be sustained.
20and τ∗. For future use, we deﬁne q∗ as the level of q that satisﬁes both ﬁrst-order
conditions. The ideal policy of R is at (0,0).T h e q =0line shows the level of T such
that Tµ− cN =0 .
We will focus on regions of the policy space that are relevant for our analysis, i.e.,
on policies that are preferred by both R and P to the maximum redistribution policy.
Note that these policies must lie strictly to the right of q =0since, if restricted to q =0 ,
P prefers maximum redistribution.
We show a typical indiﬀerence curve of a poor individual who is in the PRcoalition,
denoted by WP. The egg shape of the indiﬀerence curve can be derived by noting that
at points of intersection with τ∗ the slope must be inﬁnite (see 9), whereas at points
of intersection with T∗ the slope is zero (see 11). Lastly, it is easy to show that the
indiﬀerence curves of rich individuals are convex (one such curve is WR in the ﬁgure).
The PR coalition can oﬀer voters policies in its Pareto set. The Pareto set is
characterized in Figure 2 (the bold curves). It is composed of two distinct sets. The
ﬁrst one is a set of policies characterized by T =0a n da ni n t e r v a lo fτ from τ =0to an
upper limit that is no greater than τ∗. Since these policies lie to the left of the q =0
line, any small increase in T makes both R and P worse oﬀ. Being to the left of the
q =0line, however, implies that this portion of the Pareto set is not relevant for our
analysis. The second part of the Pareto set is ‘interior’; it is composed of policies at the
tangencies of the indiﬀerence curves of R and P. Only this portion is relevant to our
analysis. Moreover, this portion of the Pareto set is always to the left of both the τ∗
and the T∗ line. Otherwise, both groups can be made better oﬀ when taxes are reduced
(see the Appendix for a complete proof).
We can now describe the feasible policies that the PR coalition can implement in
equilibrium (Figure 3). These are policies on their Pareto set which both prefer to the
maximum redistribution policy (0,τ∗).T o ﬁnd these policies, we simply consider the
indiﬀerence curve which gives P the same utility as the maximum redistribution policy.
This indiﬀerence curve, which we denote as the p curve, is the locus of (T,τ) satisfying:
y(1 − T − τ)+τµ− G(T + τ)+V (
Tµ− cN
k
)=y(1 − τ∗)+τ∗µ − G(τ∗). (p)
Second, consider the indiﬀerence curve of R which provides the rich with the same
21utility as maximum redistribution. The r curve is:
¯ y(1 − T − τ)+τµ− G(T + τ)=¯ y(1 − τ∗)+τ∗µ − G(τ∗).( r )
The shaded area in Figure 3 shows the area bounded by these curves. The set of
winning policies consists of the set described by the intersection of the Pareto Set-the
bold curve-with the shaded area. We will henceforth refer to this set of winning policies
by Winning Interior Policies (WIP). Note that WIP is characterized by lower total taxes
than under maximum redistribution, i.e., τ + T<τ ∗.
5.2 The Eﬀects of Greater Diversity
We now turn to our central analysis: the eﬀect of greater diversity on feasible policy
outcomes (i.e., on the WIP set). Increased diversity makes it more expensive to keep
interest groups in the PR coalition at any given level of utility since providing them
with any given level of targeted goods requires higher targeted tax rates.17 How will
the increase in diversity be accommodated by the coalition? Will greater diversity lead
to an increase in general redistribution or to higher targeted tax rates? At what point
will the PR coalition break down? We turn to these questions next.
To understand how increased diversity aﬀects the set of feasible policy outcomes, we
start by examining how it aﬀects the desired tradeoﬀ between the two policy instruments
for all members of the coalition. First, note that an increase in N aﬀects neither the
reservation utility nor the shape of R’s indiﬀerence curves. Hence the r curve remains
unchanged. The tradeoﬀ for P, on the other hand, changes. At any given policy
bundle (T,τ), all interest group members of the coalition obtain a lower level of q (since
cN increases). This implies that the marginal beneﬁto faT increase—V 0 (q)
µ
k—is higher
than previously whereas the marginal beneﬁto faτ increase—µ—is unchanged. The
marginal costs of the two policies are unchanged as well. Consequently, members of
interest groups are now willing to bear a larger decrease in τ for a given increase in T,
i.e., the indiﬀerence curves of P, and in particular the p curve, become steeper.
The steeper indiﬀerence curves of P and the unchanged ones of R imply that the
new Pareto set lies below the old one. Indeed, it lies strictly below. That is, for any T
17It is here that the assumption of a ﬁxed cost associated with producing or distributing each targeted
plays a role.
22belonging to the old Pareto set, the associated τ is strictly lower in the new Pareto set.18
Hence, if the increase in diversity were accommodated by keeping R at the same level of
utility as before, the new policy would be characterized by lower general redistribution
(lower τ) and higher T.
The eﬀect on the egg-shaped p curve can be derived as follows: as N increases, the
utility from maximum redistribution remains unchanged, whereas P’s utility from any
other (T,τ) policy (with q>0) decreases. Thus, for a given level of τ on the original p
curve, the associated level of T must increase to keep P indiﬀerent to maximum redis-
tribution. The increase in T, moreover, is greater than what is needed to compensate
solely for the decrease in q (i.e. dT
dN >c / µ ) since, were it only to restore the original q
level, P would be worse oﬀ due to the greater tax distortion. The WIP set lies in a
region where P would prefer to increase both tax rates (to the left of both the τ∗ and
the T∗ lines), hence increasing T further makes P better oﬀ. Thus, on the relevant part
of the new p curve, each τ is associated with a higher level of q and higher T. In terms
of Figure 4, increases in N "shrink" the egg-shaped p curve.
The set of policies in WIP consists of those policies in the Pareto set of the PR
coalition bounded by r and p. T h eW I Ps e ti ss h o w ni nb o l di nF i g u r e4 . S i n c e
an increase in N shifts the Pareto set downwards and the p curve to the right, we can
conclude that the set of policies that belong to the new WIP must lie below and to the
right of the old WIP, as shown in the ﬁgure. This implies that the policies that can
be implemented in equilibrium are characterized by higher T and lower τ. Although
without specifying the exact process that gives rise to the choice of a particular equilib-
rium policy we can only examine the eﬀect of increased diversity on the WIP set, we can
nonetheless state that a large enough increase in diversity will be unambiguously associ-
ated with lower general redistribution and higher targeted tax rates if the coalition does
n o tb r e a kd o w n ,a si sc l e a rf r o mF i g u r e4 . T h u s ,a ss o c i e t yb e c o m e sm o r ed i v e r s e ,t h e
set of equilibrium policies tends to involve less general redistribution and more targeted
taxation. As diversity increases, consequently, P0 and excluded interest groups are in
18Also the ideal policy has lower τ and higher T : to see this, note that when N increases, the T
∗ locus
shifts to the right. The ﬁrst-order condition implies that total taxation remains constant and hence, by
(8), q
∗ must also remain constant. This implies that the new ideal policy is characterized by a higher T
and a lower τ.
23general made worse oﬀ.
One may wonder whether this process implies that ever greater diversity always
leads to more spending on interest groups to the detriment of the general poor. The
endogeneity of political parties is critical to thinking about this question since, as we
show below, for a high enough level of diversity the coalition between the rich and
the interest groups breaks down. Hence, at a high enough level of diversity, further
increases in the latter do not lead to higher targeted transfers but, on the contrary, lead
to the destruction of the coalition and to the restoration of the maximum level of general
redistribution.
Proposition 2: There exists an N∗ such that for N>N ∗, the unique equilibrium
is maximum redistribution.
Proof: See the Appendix.||
As N increases, the r curve remains unchanged, but the p curve moves to the right
and the Pareto set moves downwards and hence, as can be seen also in Figure 4, the
WIP interval shrinks. For a high enough level of N, N∗, the WIP interval consists of
solely one point given by the tangency between r and p.F o r N>N ∗,W I Pi se m p t y .
At this point the PRcoalition breaks because there does not exist a policy that both R
and P prefer to maximum redistribution. The sole remaining pure strategy equilibrium
is given by maximum redistribution and P0 winning.
The proposition above establishes one of the main results of our analysis, namely,
that the eﬀect of greater diversity is non-monotonic. Increases in diversity tend to be
associated with worse outcomes for all groups excluded from the reigning political coali-
tion until a point is reached where this coalition collapses and maximum redistribution
is the unique equilibrium outcome. This breakdown happens because a compromise
between the rich and the interest groups in the coalition is no longer feasible (in the
sense that one of the two groups would prefer maximum redistribution to any policy the
coalition can oﬀer). The PRcoalition is not able to command a majority of voters and
the only equilibrium outcome is maximum redistribution.
246A M a j o r i t y o f I n t e r e s t G r o u p s
The preceding analysis assumed that the majority of the population did not belong
to an interest group (or, alternatively, was not represented by a politician), so that
the aggregate population share of the diﬀerent P0
is was less than a half (but at least
.5 − λ, since the share of P0 is less than .5). We now assume that the majority of the
population is represented by interest groups. This case yields similar conclusions and
some additional interesting results.
To proceed, ﬁrst note that the same equilibria characterized in our previous analysis
are equilibria in this case as well. In particular, P0 still wins the election when parties are
homogenous, and a minimal winning coalition of the rich and several interest groups may
w i nb yo ﬀering some speciﬁc taxes and some general redistribution. For this coalition,
the eﬀect of increased diversity on equilibrium outcomes is the same as in the previous
analysis.
There is also an additional possible set of equilibrium policies that can exist in this
case, however. Namely, a minimal winning coalition composed only of interest groups
can command a majority of supporters and win the election. We henceforth refer to
this coalition as the “interest groups coalition”.
In order for the interest groups coalition to win, its members must prefer its policy
to maximum redistribution, i.e., p must hold. Maintaining the assumption of equal
treatment for all interest groups in the coalition, we can easily ﬁnd the equilibrium policy
oﬀered by such a coalition of P0
is. It is the (unique) ideal policy for the representative
group in the coalition. As derived in the preceding analysis, the ideal policy of a poor
interest group is given by (7) and (11) at an interior solution. These policies satisfy
T+τ = τ∗ and q = q∗. There are also two corner solutions: one with τ =0a n do n l y( 1 1 )
satisﬁed (and thus T>τ ∗) and another one with T =0and maximum redistribution (at
w h i c hp o i n tt h ep o l i c yo ﬀered by the coalition is identical to that which would be oﬀered
by P0). Thus, as long as this coalition’s ideal policy is not at the corner solution with
T =0 , this coalition oﬀers policies with greater total taxation than the PRcoalition and
also, as we show in the appendix, greater targeted distribution than the PR coalition.
The eﬀect of increased diversity on the equilibrium policy of the interest groups
coalition can be found by totally diﬀerentiating (7)and (11) with respect to N.A t a n
25interior solution, τ falls and T increases so as to keep total taxation and q constant at
τ∗ and q∗ respectively.19 Hence, as in the previous analysis, as long as the coalition
is sustained, an increase in diversity results in greater targeted redistribution and lower
general redistribution so that all individuals outside the interest group coalition are made
strictly worse oﬀ.
When will the interest groups coalition break down? Unlike for the coalition of the
rich with poor interest groups, the collapse of the interest groups coalition is not because
of the failure to ﬁnd a policy on the Pareto set that makes the coalition members better
oﬀ relative to maximum redistribution. Rather, the breakdown results from the fact that
targeted goods are so expensive that the interest groups within the coalition themselves
prefer maximum redistribution to targeted redistribution. At this point, maximum
redistribution is itself the ideal policy of the coalition.
Note that it is not possible to say which coalition type (the PR coalition or the
interest group coalition) breaks down at a higher level of diversity. This is because
although the interest groups coalition can choose its preferred policy and thus need not
satisfy the r constraint, it will also have to distribute targeted goods to a larger number
of interest groups (since all individuals in the coalition belong to an interest group unlike
in the case of the PRcoalition). Consequently, the interest groups coalition may break
a tal o w e rl e v e lo fd i v e r s i t yt h a nt h em i x e dPR coalition.
For all diversity levels lower than the one which triggers maximum redistribution,
the equilibrium policy of the interest groups coalition makes the rich strictly worse oﬀ
than maximum redistribution (since total taxation for the interest groups coalition is no
smaller than τ∗ and some of the proceeds of the taxation are targeted solely to interest
groups rather than being redistributed equally among all). Af o r t i o r i ,t h er i c ha r e
worse oﬀ with the interest group coalition than with the PR coalition. Furthermore,
at suﬃciently high levels of diversity, the interest groups coalition’s policies make the
excluded poor worse oﬀ than a policy of zero redistribution, and consequently worse oﬀ
with this coalition than with the PR coalition. Thus, it is simultaneously possible
for the poor, the rich, and the excluded poor interest groups to be worse oﬀ with the
interest group coalition than with the PR coalition, whereas it is never possible for all
19Once a corner solution with τ =0is reached, greater diversity continues to increase T (but not
enough to compensate for the increase in N, and consequently q falls).
26these groups to be better oﬀ under the interest group coalition. This is shown formally
in the Appendix.
Our general conclusion remains as in our previous section. As diversity increases,
with either type of coalition, there is in general greater targeted redistribution and lower
general redistribution. At a suﬃciently high level of diversity, the unique equilibrium
outcome is one of zero targeted transfers and maximum redistribution.
7 Discussion
In this section we discuss the role of various assumptions. Several of the assumptions
were made to simplify our analysis but are otherwise not essential to the results. First,
we have assumed that all interest groups members have low income. One could also allow
some of the rich to be divided into special interest groups. In that case, in addition to
the coalition between the rich with some (poor) interest groups, an alternative winning
coalition could exist composed of both rich interest groups and poor interest groups.
Our conclusions would remain similar: increases in diversity tend to make excluded
individuals (in particular the poor) worse oﬀ, but at a suﬃciently high level of diversity
the coalition collapses and maximum redistribution is the unique equilibrium outcome.
Second, we have assumed that there exists a poor group without any special interest
(or that only its general redistribution interest is represented in the political process).
Alternatively, in a more general model in which agents diﬀer in the intensity of their
preferences for targeted relative to general redistribution, this could be an interest group
that gives relatively low weight to targeted goods and hence whose ideal policy consists
of the smallest amount of targeted redistribution. In that case, the representative of
this group would win the election when all parties are homogeneous.
Third, we have considered utility functions which are linear in income, or more
generally linear in the utility from some common (non targeted) good, whereas we as-
sumed concavity in the utility from the targeted good. This is not important for the
analysis and all our results go through if, alternatively, we allow utility to be concave in
income or linear in the targeted good. Thus, our analysis is applicable, as well, to the
government providing a common good such as health or education, rather than income
redistribution.
27Fourth, we assumed that taxation incurs a convex cost G(·). Our results are
unchanged if either there is no such distortion, or if there are separate tax distortion
functions for general redistributive taxation and for targeted taxation.
The assumption that there is a cost c associated with each targeted good is, on
the other hand, essential to our comparative statics results with respect to diversity. If
this cost did not exist, then the extent of the diversity of tastes within the coalition
would not play a role since the cost of providing targeted goods would not depend
on taste heterogeneity. The way these costs are modelled, however, is not essential.
They can be thought of (and modelled) as the cost of production, the cost of targeting
redistribution, or as the cost of organizing an interest group. Furthermore, they need
not be ﬁxed costs. Rather, our results require the weaker property that the total cost of
providing a given quantity of targeted redistribution per individual increases with taste
diversity. This, coupled with the assumption that platforms should lie on the Pareto
set of a coalition, is the key to our comparative statics results. The assumption that
special interest groups have the same size or that they receive symmetric treatment, on
the other hand, is only for expositional ease.
Lastly, our stability condition for parties allows a subcoalition to split from its
party but not to form new parties. This asymmetry stems from our need to restrict the
possible deviations of coalition members since in our model the core may be empty, as
is typical in a multidimensional policy space.
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that at low levels of diversity, targeted redistribution and the provision
of speciﬁc goods (e.g., local public goods) is an equilibrium phenomenon. This arises
either when the rich and some poor interest groups form a winning coalition or when
the interest groups themselves form a winning coalition if their share in the population
exceeds a majority. In the former case, the rich trade-oﬀ providing speciﬁc targeted
goods in exchange for lower overall taxation and the interest groups sacriﬁce some gen-
eral redistribution which would favor the poor overall. At higher levels of diversity,
the funding of these speciﬁc goods increases at the expense of general redistribution.
For societies which are very diverse, on the other hand, no such coalitions can be sus-
28tained. The unique equilibrium consists of zero targeted redistribution and the winning
policy serves instead the “common” interest of the poor in the form of maximum general
redistribution.
Our results suggest that examining directly the empirical relationship between tar-
geted transfers, non-excludable public goods, and measures of diversity (targetability)
may be fruitful. Although the relationship between diversity, income heterogeneity and
policy outcomes has not itself been the direct object of empirical analysis, our results
may nonetheless help shed light on some empirical ﬁndings in the literature.20 For
example, Easterly and Levine (1997) ﬁnd a strong negative correlation across countries
between ethnic fragmentation and the provision of public goods (e.g., education and
infrastructure) and Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) ﬁnd a similar relationship across
states in the US.21 In our framework, we can think of education, health, or infrastructure
(roads, telephones, etc.) as corresponding to the good provided by general redistribu-
tion and other government transfers as corresponding to our targeted goods. Our results
are therefore consistent with the above ﬁndings. In addition, Alesina, Baqir, and East-
erly (2000) ﬁnd that public employment in US cities - which they interpret as targeted
transfers - increases with ethnic fragmentation. This is also consistent with our model.
In the future it would be of interest to explore how our results change with diﬀerent
electoral rules or forms of government and to extend the political model to allow for
endogenous party formation in a non-cooperative game.22 Endogenizing the number
of diﬀerent speciﬁc interests who are represented in the political process would also be
an important extension, as an alternative interpretation of our interest groups is that
these are agents that have found it in their interest to form a “targetable” group. Such
a model would be considerably richer as it would allow one to explore the relationship
between endogenous and exogenous diversity, party politics, and redistribution.
20See Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) for a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature of ethnic
diversity and economic outcomes.
21See also Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001).
22For a survey and analysis of the eﬀect of electoral rules on economic outcomes see Persson and
Tabellini (2000).
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1. Characterization of the Pareto set for the coalition of R and Pi:
First, consider policies to the left of the q =0line. Such policies with (T0 > 0,τ0)
cannot be on the Pareto set. For any such policy, a policy with (0,τ0) constitutes a
Pareto improvement for R and P. Consider policies on the T =0line. As explained in
the text, such policies are part of the Pareto set for some τ ≤ ˜ τ<τ ∗. To compute the
bound ˜ τ we look at the set of indiﬀerence curve of R such that each passes both through
(0,τ) for some τ<τ ∗ and through some policy (T>0,τ0) to the right of the q =0line
which makes Pi better oﬀ relative to (0,τ). The limit ˜ τ is the one that corresponds to
the indiﬀerence curve associated with the highest level of indirect utility for R.
Second, consider policies to the right of the q =0l i n e . W eh a v ec l a i m e dt h a tt h e
only relevant region for the Pareto set is the region to the left of both the T∗ and the τ∗
lines. Consider now the region to the right of the T∗ line but to the left of the τ∗ line.
In this region, the slope of the indiﬀerence curve of P is
−
−y − G0 + V 0 µ
k
−y − G0 + µ
> 0
whereas the slope of the indiﬀerence curve of R, −
−¯ y−G0
−¯ y−G0+µ, is negative. This means
that there can be no tangency of indiﬀerence curves in this region. Moreover, boundary
points with (T,τ =0 )also cannot be part of the Pareto set since (T0,0) for T0 <Twill
be a Pareto improvement for both R and P (because these policies are to the right of
the T∗ line).
Similarly, for the region to the right of the τ∗ line but to the left of the T∗ line,
the slope of the indiﬀerence curve of P is positive and that of R is negative and thus no
tangencies can occur (there are no boundary point). Finally, for the region of points
which are to the right of both the τ∗ and the T∗ lines, since both indiﬀerence curves are
convex towards (0,0), a Pareto improvement would consist of switching to a policy on
either the τ∗ or the T∗ line.||
2 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
Let N∗ denote the level of N such that r and p are tangent. Thus N∗ and the
30associated policy (b T,b τ) solve (p), (r),a n d
−¯ y − G0
−¯ y − G0 + µ
=
−y − G0 + V 0 µ
k
−y − G0 + µ
Since the egg shaped p curve "shrinks" with N, then for all N>N ∗,t h e r ea r en o
policies in the Pareto set of R and the P0
is which satisfy both r and p.||
3. Characterization of the policies of the interest group coalition.
(i) The interest group coalition oﬀers policies with greater targeted taxation than
the coalition of the rich and the interest groups.
Proof: Let the ideal policy of the poor interest group be denoted by (˜ T,˜ τ).C o n s i d e r
now a coalition the same P0
is as above and now add representatives of R as well (note
that such a coalition is greater than a minimal winning). Their Pareto set only contains
policies characterized by T0 < ˜ T. To see this, note that ˜ T satisﬁes
V 0((˜ Tµ− cN)/k)=k,
whereas for T>˜ T,then V 0((Tµ−cN)/k) <k . Hence the (absolute value of the) slope
of the indiﬀerence curve of the poor interest group for T>˜ T is
−y−G0+V 0 µ
k
−y−G0+µ < 1 whereas
t h e( a b s o l u t ev a l u eo ft h e )s l o p eo ft h er i c hi s
−¯ y−G0
−¯ y−G0+µ > 1 s ot h e r ec a n n o tb ea n y
tangency in this region. Thus, such a coalition must have T0 < ˜ T in its Pareto set.
Lastly, note that coalitions in equilibrium are minimal winning. Thus, when both
a coalition of R and P0
is and the coalition of only P0
is exist, then the coalition of R
and P0
ism u s th a v el e s si n t e r e s tg r o u p st h a nt h ec o a l i t i o no fo n l yP0
is. This means that
their Pareto set policies are characterized by T which satisﬁes T<T 0 < ˜ T. Thus, the
coalition of only P0
is has larger targeted transfers than that of R and some P0
is.||
( i i )T h ee x c l u d e dp o o rc a nb ew o r s eo ﬀ under the interest group coalition than
under zero redistribution. That is, if we deﬁne the policies of the interest group coalition
that fulﬁll the ﬁrst-order conditions by ˜ τ (N), ˜ T (N), then:
Lemma 6 For all N>N c,w h e r eNc satisﬁes ˜ τ (Nc)µ − τ∗y − G(τ∗)=0 ,t h e
poor (and excluded interest groups) are worse oﬀ under the policy of the interest groups
coalition than under zero redistribution if the equilibrium policy of the interest group is
diﬀerent than maximum redistribution.
31Proof: Recall that the interest group coalition imposes total taxes of τ∗.T h e p o o r
are indiﬀerent between no redistribution and the interest groups coalition policy if:
y(1 − τ∗)+˜ τ (Nc)µ − G(τ∗)=y
hence,
˜ τ (Nc)µ − τ∗y − G(τ∗)=0 .
Recalling that as N increases, ˜ τ (N) falls, completes the proof.||
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